Giovanni Carnevali arrived at the Continassa on 11 June with three tools in his briefcase: a stopwatch, a calculator, and what Tuttosport’s Lorenzo Aprile memorably describes as a pocket manual on good manners. What he inherited was a squad bloated with expensive underperformers, a poisoned relationship with PSG, and a UEFA Settlement Agreement that demanded immediate attention. What he produced across three months — eight players out, nine in, the UEFA financial parameters respected — is the subject of the most rigorous independent financial analysis yet published on the new administration’s work.
The Summer in Numbers — Costs Contained, But the Wage Bill Has Still Risen
The headline achievement is unambiguous: Juventus presented a Europa League squad list less expensive than the one submitted for the Champions League in February 2026 — the fundamental requirement of the Settlement Agreement met in full. The outgoings were extensive: Vlahović, David, Openda, Miretti, Arthur, Perin, Di Gregorio, and Joao Mário. The incomings: Kolo Muani, Ekhator, Lucumí, Alajbegovic, Vicario, Çelik, Grabara, Woltemade, and Sarr.
But a closer examination of the overall wage bill reveals a more complex picture. Despite the restructuring, the total impact on the club’s accounts from salaries and amortisation has grown by 18.92%. How can that increase be reconciled with the UEFA compliance that was simultaneously achieved?
Professor Bava’s Analysis: Costs Contained to €15 Million — an Acceptable Price
Fabrizio Bava, Professor of Business Economics at the University of Turin and one of Italy’s most respected analysts of football finances, provided Tuttosport with the most authoritative independent assessment available.
“You have to start from the premise that Juventus is a top club and does not want to stop being one. If you make mistakes for two consecutive years with extremely expensive signings — as happened with Koopmeiners and Douglas Luiz — you carry high amortisation and high wages for years. Carnevali managed to substantially renew the squad and contain costs, betting on prospects like Alajbegovic and working with loans. In the end, the overall increase in fixed costs amounts to approximately €15 million between amortisation and wages. An acceptable price to pay for not impoverishing the club’s competitiveness.”
“Kolo Muani Is the Only Painful Note — Not for His Performance, but for His Cost”
The financial exception that complicates the otherwise disciplined summer is, paradoxically, the signing that has generated the most sporting excitement. Kolo Muani’s combination of amortisation and wages has consumed most of the saving generated by Vlahović’s departure — making the permanent acquisition a financially costly decision even if it proves to be exactly the right sporting one.
“The only painful note,” Bava states, “coincides with the purchase of Kolo Muani. Not for his current performance — that is understood. But because between wages and amortisation he has burned much of the saving achieved from Vlahović’s exit. How do you address that? By selling, in January or by 30 June, a player with a particularly heavy balance sheet impact.”
“No Significant Capital Gains in Five Years — and the Numbers Are Getting Worse”
The more uncomfortable dimension of Bava’s assessment concerns the structural trajectory of Juventus’s finances — and here the picture is considerably more challenging than the summer’s activity alone might suggest.
“Carnevali is the third consecutive director called to manage an extremely difficult financial situation. There are no clubs willing to buy Juventus’s surplus players at the prices the club is asking. Juventus has not managed to generate meaningful capital gains — above €20 million — for at least five years. At the same time, the club refuses to sell its main assets, to avoid impoverishing Spalletti’s squad. In the current state, therefore, the probability of reaching Break Even by 2028 is becoming increasingly low.”
The specific numbers that define the deterioration are stark. The 2026 accounts included over €50 million in capital gains. For 2027, those are virtually zeroed — except for the Muharemović windfall already secured. Add the €30 million gap from reduced capital gains to the €30 million gap from the absence of Champions League revenue, and the combined deterioration reaches €60 million. With a significant operating loss on top, the total deficit could exceed €100 million.
“A Capital Increase Is Inevitable — Not for UEFA, but for the Law”
The most consequential conclusion of Bava’s analysis concerns what happens when those losses accumulate against the club’s net assets. “I consider a new capital increase a certainty — even though it is not yet being discussed openly. An intervention that is not required by UEFA parameters, but that will be imposed by law and the civil code: the loss could erode the net assets to the point where it becomes unavoidable.”
The next Board of Directors meeting is scheduled for 24 September. A capital increase is expected to be among the central items on the agenda. The rebuilding of Juventus’s sporting identity has been impressive. The rebuilding of its financial foundations remains the longer and more difficult task — and one whose most critical moments may still lie ahead.
